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Introduction
The emergence of ethical banks is an expression of the growing demand for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the banking industry of developed countries. Quoting Bénabou and Tirole (2010, p.2) , CSR "is about sacri…cing pro…ts in the social interest. For there to be a sacri…ce, the …rm must go beyond its legal and contractual obligations, on a voluntary basis. CSR embraces a wide range of behaviors, such as being employee friendly, environment friendly, mindful of ethics, respectful of communities where the …rm's plants are located, and even investor friendly". In line with the previous de…nition, we interpret ethical banks as socially responsible lenders, because they commit to fund only socially relevant projects, i.e. ethical projects, which provide both social and economic advantages, but which deliver lower expected revenue than standard ones. Ethical banks are not the only socially responsible agents in the credit market of high income countries, we call "motivated" those borrowers that prefer to engage in socially valuable activities as ethical projects because, by doing so, they receive a non-monetary premium for social responsibility. Contrary to ethical banks, motivated borrowers do not commit to ethical projects and will still invest in standard projects if their expected return is su¢ ciently higher than the one of ethical projects. Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2015) show that the assortative matching between ethical banks and motivated borrowers allows to reduce the frictions caused by moral hazard. The e¢ ciency gain can be so high that motivated borrowers trading with ethical banks end up receiving better contract conditions than standard borrowers trading with commercial banks. Better prospects translate in larger loans, higher expected returns for the borrower and lower interest rates and are possible when the premium for social responsibility is su¢ ciently high. Such a premium accrues motivated entrepreneurs' payo¤s when they undertake an ethical project …nanced by an ethical bank and the project turns out to be successful. Importantly, the surplus arising from the matching between agents caring about social issues implies that ethical banks authorize larger loans than commercial banks, and borrowers …nanced by ethical banks, having controlled for borrowers'characteristics, are charged a lower interest rate.
In our previous paper we investigate how socially responsible lenders and motivated borrowers interact with each other when they participate in a credit market where standard lenders and borrowers also operate and moral hazard is the unique market failure, meaning that both borrowers and lenders' characteristics are common knowledge. As already mentioned, in the previous paper we proved that motivated borrowers can obtain better credit conditions than other borrowers if the premium for social responsibility is su¢ ciently high.
Suppose, now, that borrowers' motivation is private information and no credible commitment is available to entrepreneurs so that their pro-social attitude can be falsi…ed. In particular, a borrower could pretend to be socially responsible in order to strengthen its bargaining position. This is precisely what happens in our framework where standard borrowers are the "bad"types willing to take advantage of their private information. In our setting, falsifying borrowers' CSR is straightforward because entrepreneurs pretending to be motivated simply have to undertake ethical projects …nanced by ethical banks. This has, however, negative implications for ethical lenders as, when a standard entrepreneur mimics a motivated one, he/she possibly misbehaves and the lending contract is not pro…table anymore for the bank. The situation we describe may occur in a market where borrowers are start-ups, or new …rms lacking a reputation and credible commitment to CSR does not exist.
To sum up, in this paper we analyze the interaction between heterogeneous borrowers and heterogeneous lenders in a credit market where both moral hazard and adverse selection on the borrowers'side have bite because banks are not able to observe borrowers'behavior nor they can distinguish motivated from standard borrowers.
We show that, under moral hazard and adverse selection, the bene…t arising from trade between ethical banks and motivated borrowers is partially o¤set by the information rent appropriated by standard borrowers. In particular, the equilibrium outcome is such that standard borrowers sign with commercial banks the same contract as under moral hazard only; whereas motivated borrowers trading with ethical banks preserve their higher borrowing capacity but loose the bene…t of better contract conditions. In di¤erent words, motivated borrowers pay the cost of separation by accepting contractual terms that do not appeal to a standard entrepreneur. Moreover, as under moral hazard only, the market is fully segmented, meaning that standard agents trade among themselves in the market for standard projects while ethical banks trade with motivated borrowers in the market for ethical projects.
Turning to the modeling strategy, we study a model where borrowers are the informed party proposing contracts to lenders. Moreover, as it will be better argued in Subsection 4.1, the type of borrowers a¤ects the ethical banks pro…ts, through the solution of the moral hazard problem, making our model a common value one. We are thus in a framework with informed principals and common values and, borrow from the seminal paper by Maskin and Tirole (1992) .
In Maskin and Tirole (1992) , heterogeneous principals propose one single menu of contracts to uninformed and uniform agents and a key-concept in the paper is the Rothschild-Stliglitz-Wilson (RSW) allocation (with homogeneous agents). Such allocation indicates the menu of incentive compatible contracts that are pro…table type-by-type and allow separation at the lowest cost. 2 Conversely, in our model heterogeneous principals (borrowers) propose contracts to uninformed and heterogeneous agents (lenders). The important di¤erence is that, in our Contract Proposal Game, informed principals o¤er two 2 Maskin and Tirole (1992) name the RSW allocation, where the incentive-compatible contracts are pro…table type-bytype, after the in ‡uential papers by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) . As we will further discuss in the paper, informed principals can always guarantee themselves the payo¤ reached with the RSW allocation which is the unique equilibrium when it is interim e¢ cient. When it is not, then multiplicity of equilibria arises in the contract proposal game.
menus (one for each type of agents), instead of only one. 3 We show that all contracts in the two menus break-even type-by-type and that the menu for ethical lenders contains the RSW allocation with market segmentation (see below). Instead, the menu for standard lenders always contains a pooling contract, since for standard lenders the two types of borrowers are equivalent, as it will be clear in what follows. 4 Once each type of agents (lenders) has accepted the menu designed for it, each informed principal (borrower) selects the preferred option among the contracts available in the two menus. More speci…cally, each borrower picks the overall preferred contract from one menu and the null contract from the other menu. We …rst show that the presence of heterogeneous lenders and the fact of o¤ering them two di¤erent menus lead to a substantial improvement in the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium allocation and guarantees its uniqueness. Finally, we show that a su¢ cient condition for the unique equilibrium outcome to be interim e¢ cient is that the share of motivated borrowers in the population of investors is lower than 50%.
As for e¢ ciency, the cost of separation would be higher if ethical banks were the unique type of lenders in the credit market. Intuitively, in the RSW allocation with market segmentation contained in the menu for ethical banks, borrowers take into account that trading with standard lenders represents an outsideoption that relaxes the self-selection constraint and helps preventing standard borrowers from mimicking motivated entrepreneurs. We thus conclude that the RSW allocation with market segmentation Paretodominates the RSW allocation with homogeneous lenders. Moreover, in the model with homogeneous agents, the RSW allocation is always an equilibrium. In our setting with heterogeneous agents, instead, the equilibrium delivers market segmentation and the RSW allocation with market segmentation is not an equilibrium outcome 5 . Indeed, only motivated borrowers pick the contract contained in the RSW allocation inside the menu for ethical banks, whereas standard borrowers pick the contract appearing in the menu o¤ered to standard lenders. Hence, the RSW allocation with market segmentation contains a latent contract.
As for uniqueness, the existence of two menus designed for the two types of lenders and the fact that cross-subsidies between di¤erent menus are impossible (meaning that transfers between di¤erent lenders are not feasible 6 ), imply that the uniqueness issue is fully solved. Only cross-subsidies inside the menu for ethical banks make sense in our setting. To prove uniqueness we thus show that, in the menu for ethical banks, it is impossible to design separating contracts with cross-subsidies that Pareto dominate the equilibrium allocation with market segmentation. Hence, we conclude that the equilibrium outcome with market segmentation is necessarily unique. Finally, we study the e¢ ciency properties of the unique 3 Each menu also contains the null contract which works as an "exit option" and allow for market segmentation. 4 In particular, the menu o¤ered to ethical banks contains two self-selecting contracts and the null one. The menu for standard lenders contains, instead, a pooling contract together with the null one. 5 We thus distinguish between the RSW allocation with market segmentation and the equilibrium allocation with market segmentation. The latter contains only one contract from the RSW allocation with market segmentation (the one designed for motivated borrowers). 6 With cross-subsidies among banks, the menu designed for the standard bank would contain a pooling contract letting the bank earn negative pro…ts to be covered with positive pro…ts earned by the ethical bank in the other menu. But, in the second stage of the Contract Proposal Game, the standard lender would not accept a menu entailing negative pro…ts.
equilibrium outcome and …nd a su¢ cient condition such that the latter is interim e¢ cient (meaning that, in the hypothetical case where transfers between di¤erent menus were feasible, no dominating contracts with cross-subsidies would exist). More speci…cally, a su¢ cient condition for the equilibrium with market segmentation to be interim e¢ cient is that the share of motivated borrowers in the population of potential borrowers is less than 50%.
To sum up, our results show that the existence of heterogeneous agents receiving di¤erent menus and the fact that transfers between the di¤erent menus are not feasible, improve e¢ ciency and solve the problem of multiplicity of equilibria in games with informed principals.
Our paper is related to the small literature on CSR in the credit market of high-income countries. From the point of view of the modelling strategy, the setting we study borrows from Tirole (2006) .
The paper is also related to the models dealing with signaling and informed principals in the credit market that are superbly reviewed in the same book (Tirole 2006, chapter 6) . In those studies, good borrowers try to signal attractive prospects to investors by introducing distortions that are costly to them but would be even costlier to bad borrowers; the informed party can act as a principal by proposing the contract (as in our model) or can accept the contract o¤ered by the uninformed party. Even if the idea that a …rm can follow CSR to strengthen its market position is not new (see the excellent review on the economics of CSR by Kitzmueller and Shimshack 2012) , to the best of our knowledge our paper is the …rst studying a situation where no available commitment to CSR exists such that a borrower can falsify its interest for social issues.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model set-up and the payo¤s of socially responsible lenders and motivated borrowers. In Section 3, we show how the matching between socially responsible agents relaxes the incentive compatible constraint of motivated borrowers and we brie ‡y report results from Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2015) about the characterization of loan agreements o¤ered in the credit market under moral-hazard only. Section 4 solves the model with both moral-hazard and adverse selection. More speci…cally, Subsection 4.1 de…nes the RSW allocation with market segmentation, shows the e¢ ciency gain it entails and characterizes the equilibrium outcome when both moral-hazard 7 Leland and Pyle (1977) is the …rst application of signaling in …nance; they show how a risk-averse owner can signal the underlying quality of its …rm in an initial public o¤ering (IPO) by retaining a substantial undiversi…ed stake in the …rm. Bhattacharya (1979) investigate signaling through dividends. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that, when the …rm has private information about the value of its assets, the decision to rise new capital can be used as a signaling devise. Among others, Besanko and Thakor (1987) , Bester (1985) and (1987), Chan and Kanatas (1985) study the possibility of signaling by pledging collateral. In Diamond (1991), a borrower enters into a short-term borrowing contract in order to signal her creditworthiness. Welch (1989) , Allen and Faulhaber (1989) 
Model Set-up
The model is borrowed from Tirole (2006) and has been illustrated in Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2015) . Here we brie ‡y present the model's setup and refer the reader to the mentioned paper for a detailed discussion of the assumptions about motivated borrowers, ethical banks and ethical projects and for some real world examples.
We consider a credit market with a large number of both risk-neutral borrowers (she) and banks (it).
Borrowers undertake a project that requires an investment. Each borrower can apply for at most one loan, and di¤erent types of projects exist. We call I k the endogenous amount of the investment, where k 2 f0; 1g indicates the type of project. When k = 1 the project is "ethical", and when k = 0 the project is "non-ethical" or standard. The di¤erence between the two projects is speci…ed below.
All the borrowers own the same asset A. The borrowers do not have su¢ cient capital and/or collateral no matter which project they are interested in, and hence need to borrow I To summarize, two sectors exist in the credit market: the market for ethical projects and the market for standard ones. The latter assures higher expected returns to investors.
All projects are subject to moral hazard: entrepreneurs can behave or misbehave. If they behave, the probability of success is
who misbehaves will enjoy a private bene…t whose value is P I. Otherwise, the private bene…t will be nought. We call a 2 f0; 1g the behavior of the entrepreneur. In particular, a = 0 if the entrepreneur misbehaves, while a = 1 if she behaves. Thus, p (1) = p H and p (0) = p L , respectively. The borrowers are protected by limited liability: hence their income cannot be negative. Given limited liability, the moral hazard problem is relevant even though both agents are risk neutral.
There are also two types of banks and entrepreneurs, respectively denoted as i 2 f0; 1g and j 2 f0; 1g.
For both lenders and borrowers type 0 denotes the standard agents, whereas type 1 indicates socially responsible agents. 
In the following sections, we characterize the optimal contracts (B k ij ; I k ij ) that specify the type of project, the amount invested, and how revenues are shared between lenders and borrowers in the case of success given the type of agents trading together.
The crucial ingredients of our model are the premium for social responsibility and the premium for successful interaction : The premium for social responsibility is a non-pecuniary bene…t with monetary value that a motivated borrower obtains when undertaking an ethical project, no matter the project's outcome and whatever the type of lender. The additional premium for successful interaction is the extra premium of social responsibility accrued by a motivated agent when implementing an ethical project …nanced by an ethical bank. In fact, the motivated borrower anticipates that, if the ethical bank makes pro…ts, given its commitment to investing in ethical projects, it will use the liquidity to …nance other social and solidarity-based projects, increasing expected utility of the motivated borrower.
The entrepreneurs'payo¤ can be written as:
Note that the premium for social responsibility is positive only if a motivated borrower invests in an ethical project (j = k = 1) ; whereas the premium for successful interaction is positive only if a motivated borrower invests in an ethical project with an ethical bank (i = j = k = 1) and the project succeeds.
Standard lenders maximize their pro…ts. When the moral hazard problem is taken care of, expected pro…ts become:
We assume that ethical banks maximize expected pro…ts 9 , as do standard lenders, but commit to investing only in ethical projects (therefore k = 1): Because ethical projects have a lower pro…tability than standard ones, commitment to ethical projects implies that ethical banks are sacri…cing pro…ts for the social interest. 10 Subscript j in (3) indicates that both standard and motivated borrowers can invest with ethical banks:
As already mentioned, borrowers are endowed with all the bargaining power and propose a contract to lenders so that the banks'expected pro…ts are zero at the equilibrium. 11 The sequence of actions is thus as follows: the borrower o¤ers the contract, then the lender accepts or refuses the proposal. Subsequently, the borrower decides whether to behave or misbehave, uncertainty concerning the project is solved, and the contract is implemented. 9 One can show that nothing changes when assuming that ethical banks maximize total revenue from ethical projects. 1 0 Commitment to ethical projects is possible because borrowers have all the market power and propose contracts, in the form of a speci…c and observable project for funding, to banks which can accept or reject them. 1 1 This is equivalent to assuming Bertrand competition among lenders.
Second-best: Loan Agreements under Moral Hazard
The setting with moral hazard only is investigated in Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2015) . Here we summarize their main results because they represent the starting point of the analysis of moral hazard and adverse selection which is the focus of the present paper.
Assume that the project and the borrower type are common knowledge, while borrowers have private information on their behavior, which may or may not increase the probability of success of the project.
The optimal contract hence maximizes the borrower's utility under the borrower's incentive compatibility constraint IC To see why ethical banks are more e¢ cient than standard lenders in solving the moral hazard problem of the motivated borrower, let us consider the incentive compatibility constraint of a motivated borrower trading with an ethical bank:
The left-hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint includes all the gains obtained by the borrower when a project is successful: an increase in revenues, B standard borrowers. In the following, we study the third-best of the model, i.e. we derive the separating allocation allowing to distinguish di¤erent borrowers, we study the distortion it entails and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome. 12 
The RSW allocation with market segmentation
Recall that borrowers have all the market power and propose contracts to banks. Since borrowers are the informed party, we are considering here a case of contract design by an informed principal and the equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. The seminal paper on this topic is Maskin and Tirole We depart from Section 6.4 of Tirole (2006) for two reasons: …rst, in our setting moral-hazard is also an issue, second and more importantly for what follows, we are considering a credit market with heterogeneous borrowers and heterogeneous lenders. This implies that two menus (one for each type of lenders) will be o¤ered in equilibrium.
The three-stage timing of actions is adapted to our setting with heterogeneous agents and is the following. In the …rst stage, borrowers design a menu for standard lenders and a menu for ethical lenders and o¤er the menus to lenders. Each menu contains three contracts at most: the null contract together with either two separating contracts (one for each type of borrowers) or a pooling contract. In the second stage, lenders accept the o¤er if they earn nonnegative expected pro…ts from the contracts appearing in the menu designed for them. 13 In the third stage, each borrower picks one contract from each menu:
the contract overall preferred among all contracts appearing in the two menus and the null contract from the dominated menu. Then borrowers decide whether to behave or misbehave. Finally, uncertainty concerning the project is solved, and the contract is executed.
It is important to stress that each menu must be complete in the sense that it must contain (selfselecting) contracts for the two types of borrowers, contingent on the speci…c type of lender. In the second stage lenders accept the menu designed for them if, given their beliefs on the borrowers' type, their expected pro…ts will be non-negative. The null contract appears in each menu so that each type of 1 2 We will distinguish between the equilibrium menus o¤ered to ethical and standard banks and the equilibrium outcome/allocation. We will prove that the menu o¤ered in equilibrium to ethical banks is not unique whereas the equilibrium outcome is unique. 1 3 Recall that standard lenders optimally fund standard projects because social responsibility of motivated borrowers does not a¤ect the borrowers'incentive constraint. Ethical banks, instead, commit to fund only ethical projects.
borrower is able to trade with just one type of lender and market segmentation can occur.
Before proceeding, the following clari…cations are useful. When dealing with ethical lenders we are considering a setting with common values. In fact, the borrower's type a¤ects the expected payo¤ of the ethical bank throughout the incentive compatibility constraint of the borrower that is type dependent (see constraint IC B 11 in the previous Section). In addition, if the incentive constraint is not satis…ed, then the borrower misbehaves and the ethical lender's expected pro…ts become negative. On the contrary, the type of the borrower does not a¤ect the expected payo¤ of commercial banks so that the setting is about private values for those lenders.
To solve the contract proposal game we proceed as follows. We show that, in third-best, the secondbest contracts are incentive compatible and thus are still o¤ered when < . We then turn to the case where and we observe that the second-best contract (B 0 00 ; I 0 00 ) is the (pooling) contract characterizing the menu o¤ered to standard banks. Then, we derive the menu of contracts that borrowers o¤er to ethical lenders. To do so, we …rst de…ne the RSW allocation ignoring market segmentation.
Subsequently, we de…ne the RSW allocation with market segmentation and we show that the latter dominates the former.
14 This allows us to conclude that the RSW allocation with market segmentation is the allocation which characterizes the menu o¤ered to ethical lenders. The equilibrium outcome will be given by the contracts selected by the two types of borrowers among the contracts appearing in the two equilibrium menus.
When borrowers trade with standard lenders, separation has no meaning because all borrowers are the same. Moreover, borrowers optimally o¤er the second-best contract (B 11 ) verify such constraints, then those contracts will be proposed in third-best as well.
From Proposition 1 we know that motivated borrowers prefer contract (B A:
The previous reasoning implies that, when < , the credit market is fully segmented and the second-best contracts (B ) is the best contract that standard borrowers can o¤ er to ethical banks. 15 .
In the third stage, when borrowers choose a contract from each menu, motivated borrowers pick 10 is the following:
and is obtained solving the program of a standard borrower contracting for an ethical project with an ethical bank. It corresponds to program (8) ; is the best contract that standard borrowers can o¤ er to ethical banks.
Notice that, in the right-hand side of the self-selection constraint SS hom 0=1
; standard borrowers mimicking motivated ones misbehave (a = 0 so that the probability of a successful investment is just p L ). Indeed, when standard borrowers pick the contract designed for motivated types, their incentive constraint is not necessarily satis…ed because they do not receive the premium for successful interaction . The RSW allocation ignoring market segmentation assures that standard borrowers prefer contract (B 
where the incentive constraint of the motivated borrowers IC Importantly, borrowers anticipate here that the best available option for standard borrowers is contract (B 0 00 ; I 0 00 ) and that the contract targeted to standard borrowers and appearing in the menu for ethical banks will never be chosen in equilibrium (recall that any contract signed by ethical banks and standard borrowers necessarily accrues lower pro…ts than (B 0 00 ; I 0 00 ) to the latter). Nevertheless, notice once again that the menu o¤ered to ethical banks must be complete (that is, it must contain the null contract and self-selecting contracts for the two types of borrowers) and feasible for the bank (that is, the bank must earn nonnegative expected pro…ts from the menu), otherwise the bank will not accept the menu in the second stage. Indeed, we could substitute (B We are now able to describe the equilibrium with market segmentation assuring the lowest payo¤ to the borrowers. Suppose that, in the …rst stage, borrowers o¤er the menu (B Again, notice that the menu o¤ered to ethical banks in equilibrium is not unique because of the latent contract (B 1 10 ; I 1 10 ): As mentioned before, the latter can be substituted with any other contract that signed by standard or by motivated borrowers assures non-negative pro…ts to ethical banks. 1 6 In the end of Appendix 6.3, we also show that the RSW allocation in De…nition 2 is Pareto superior to the allocation derived from a program similar to RSW het but where the standard borrowers' incentive constraint is satis…ed so that standard borrowers behave in SS het
0=1
.
In the following lemma we characterize contract (B Hence, when , the "good"borrowers must pay the cost of separating from the "bad"borrowers and sign a contract which is worse than the second-best one because it entails a lower expected payment and a lower investment. We will comment on the properties of the equilibrium outcome after Proposition 3 in the following Section.
Uniqueness and e¢ ciency
From Corollary to Proposition 3 of Maskin and Tirole (1992), we know that the RSW allocation (with homogeneous agents) is interim e¢ cient for a non-empty set of beliefs. From the Corollary to Theorem 1 we also know that, if the RSW allocation is interim e¢ cient, then it is the unique equilibrium. If it is not, then a multiplicity of equilibria exists in the form of a continuum of Pareto superior separating allocations with cross-subsidies.
Importantly, as we will explain, cross-subsidies between di¤erent menus are not feasible in our setting so that we are able to show some interesting new result about uniqueness. We …rst prove that the allocation with market segmentation given by (B ) is the unique equilibrium outcome of the contract proposal game. Then we derive conditions assuring that, given the banks'priors (q; 1 q), the equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is also interim e¢ cient.
In our setting we must distinguish between interim e¢ ciency when considering cross-subsidies between contracts o¤ ered to ethical and to standard banks and when considering cross-subsidies between contracts o¤ ered to ethical bank only. We thus de…ne: The equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is Constrained Interim E¢ cient if no separating contracts pro…table in expectation exist that are preferred by both borrowers' types when only cross subsidies between contracts …nanced by ethical banks are considered.
Notice that Unconstrained Interim E¢ ciency is a more demanding criterion than Constrained Interim E¢ ciency. Intuitively, a larger set of allocations that break-even in expectation is available when crosssubsidies between ethical and standard banks are possible than when only cross-subsidies inside ethical banks are admitted. 17 1 7 Uniqueness follows from the observation below. An equilibrium allocation must be incentive compatible and, from Corollary 1 (part (ii)), must weakly Pareto-dominate the equilibrium allocation given by (B 1 11 ; I 1 11 ) and (B 0 00 ; I 0 00 ).
Because, in the second stage, banks only accept menus that guarantee nonnegative expected pro…ts, we state that:
Remark 3 In third-best, at the equilibrium, only cross-subsidies between contracts o¤ ered in the menu designed for ethical banks are possible.
In fact, in the case where cross-subsidies among banks were implemented, the menu designed for standard banks would contain a pooling contract that leads to negative pro…ts to be covered with positive pro…ts earned by ethical banks in the other menu. But the menu for standard lenders would not be accepted in the second stage of the Contract Proposal Game. We conclude that each menu must be feasible (in isolation) for the banks.
Below we show that, in the menu o¤ered to ethical banks, feasible contracts with cross-subsidies that
Pareto-dominate the allocation with market segmentation do not exist.
Proposition 2 Uniqueness. (i)
The equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is always Constrained Interim E¢ cient.
(ii) The equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is unique.
Proof. (i) See the Appendix 6.4. (ii) It directly follows from (i):
In order to verify whether Pareto dominating contracts with cross-subsidies …nanced by ethical banks exist (point (i)), we must consider two programs with ethical bank as the lender. In the …rst program (see Program 15 in Appendix 2) we derive the expected pro…ts of the ethical bank when it signs a contract with the standard borrower which entails the second-best expected pro…ts, p H B 0 00 ; plus a transfer T (the latter assures that the contract is Pareto improving for standard borrowers). From such a contract the ethical bank earns negative pro…ts which must be …nanced by a pro…table contract (B ) which is characterized by lower revenue and investment than their second-best contract, but higher investment than the second-best contract of standard borrowers. The credit market is fully segmented.
However, it cannot strictly Pareto-dominate such allocation if the latter is interim e¢ cient and so it must yield the same payo¤s to the borrowers in this case. ) than the ones characterizing contracts signed by standard borrowers and standard lenders. 18 This proves that, in third-best, the bene…t arising from trading between social responsible agents is partially o¤set by the information rent appropriated by standard borrowers. However, the cost of separation would be higher if ethical banks were the unique type of lenders in the credit market (see Lemma 1) and no market segmentation was possible.
In order to verify whether the equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is also Unconstrained
Interim E¢ cient, we consider now cross-subsidies between ethical and standard banks.
Proposition 4 Unconstrained Interim E¢ ciency. A su¢ cient condition such that the equilibrium with market segmentation is Unconstrained Interim E¢ ciency is q < Proof. See Appendix 6.5.
The proof of Proposition 4 is built as follows. In order to verify whether Pareto dominating contracts with cross-subsidies between ethical and standard banks exist, we proceed again in two steps. First, we characterize the pro…t maximizing contract for a standard bank when the latter sign with the standard borrower a contract entailing the second-best expected pro…ts, p H B Since the condition is su¢ cient but not necessary, larger values of q are still compatible with Unconstrained Interim E¢ ciency. However, when q becomes su¢ ciently larger than 1=2; then the equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is not interim e¢ cient anymore and Pareto-dominating allocations with cross-subsidies from ethical to standard banks exist. 19 As explained before, a decentralized economy is not able to implement such Pareto-improving allocations because they imply cross-subsidies between di¤erent menus, i.e. they require menus that are not feasible in isolation and thus are not chosen by lenders in the second stage of the Contract Proposal Game. However, in principle the government could intervene to restore e¢ ciency by imposing taxes to ethical banks to be used to partially …nance commercial banks. Nevertheless, the political support for such a policy would reasonably be extremely low! In fact, ethical banks are sacri…cing pro…ts in the social interest by …nancing projects which provide positive externalities to people and communities whereas commercial banks are maximizing their pro…ts investing in projects generating high expected returns and no positive externalities.
Conclusion
In our model two di¤erent credit markets exist: the market for standard projects and the market for ethical ones. We de…ne ethical projects those projects with both social and economic pro…tability but with a lower expected revenue with respect to standard ones. We model ethical banks as lenders which are able to commit to …nancing only ethical projects so that they are not interested in operating in the markets for standard projects. Motivated borrowers obtain a non-monetary bene…t (a premium for social responsibility) when they undertake ethical projects and also an additional bene…t from trading with ethical banks in the case their project is successful. This implies that motivated borrowers prefer to trade with ethical banks as long as the contract conditions are not too unfavorable with respect to those obtained with standard lenders.
We investigate how ethical banks and motivated borrowers interact together when credit markets are competitive and also standard banks and standard borrowers are active. When moral hazard is the unique market failure, we showed in a previous paper that the matching of ethical lenders with motivated borrowers reduces the frictions caused by moral-hazard and makes motivated borrowers better o¤: not only they receive the premium for corporate social responsibility but they may also obtain better contract conditions, in terms of larger loans and higher expected returns, than standard borrowers.
However, when no credible commitment to borrowers'social responsibility exists and motivated entrepreneurs receive a better prospect, then standard entrepreneurs have interest in mimicking social 1 9 Those allocations entail a payo¤ for motivated borrowers that is in between the minimum payo¤ obtained with contract (B 1 11 ; I 1 11 ) and the maximum one implied by (B 1 11 ; I 1 11 ).
responsibility by investing in ethical projects in order to obtain the dominating contract. This is the setting we study in the present paper: we solve the Contract Proposal Game where informed borrowers o¤er (possibly separating) contracts to ethical and standard banks. We contribute to the literature on Informed Principals because, in our setting, agents are heterogeneous and, as a consequence, principals o¤er multiple menus.
We show that (i) in the Contract Proposal Game with heterogeneous lenders, the equilibrium allocation entails full market segmentation and is characterized by two contracts picked from di¤erent In a nutshell, our model shows that market segmentation improves e¢ ciency and solves the problem of multiplicity of equilibria in Contract Proposal Games.
Appendix

Second-best contracts
The net present value of both projects (ethical and non-ethical) is positive if the borrower behaves and negative otherwise. Hence, the investment cannot be implemented, in either standard or ethical projects, if it is not possible to address the moral hazard problem:
Moreover, the expected pro…t of both standard and socially responsible lenders must be non-negative.
The two lenders'participation constraints IR L 0j and IR L 1j , thus correspond to:
As illustrated in Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2015) , the problem of a borrower contracting a loan for a standard project with a standard lender is: 
The program of a motivated borrower contracting for an ethical project with an ethical bank is very similar to (8); in particular, R 1 must replace R 0 and the incentive constraint IC 
The three threshold values appearing in Proposition 1 are:
Pooling contract
The pooling contract that motivated borrowers propose to ethical banks, if they are not willing to pay the cost of separation from standard borrowers, can be de…ned as follows:
De…nition 4 Suppose that motivated borrowers propose a pooling contract B to ethical banks.
The pooling contract solves:
or it satis…es the standard borrowers'incentive constraint and the participation constraint of ethical banks.
Remember that, when the incentive constraint of standard borrowers holds, a fortiori the incentive constraint of motivated borrowers is satis…ed. Moreover, it can be easily shown (see Barigozzi and Tedeschi 2015) that the sum of the two premia for social responsibility p H + appearing in the objective function of (Pooling Contract), but not in the incentive compatibility constraint IC B 10 , does not a¤ect the optimal contract. Thus, contract (B 
Proof of Lemma 2
In order to characterize contract B 
Notice that SS het 0=1 must be binding, otherwise the second-best program, which is not feasible by assumption, would be reached; in fact, for
; the standard borrower prefers the motivated borrower's contract. Hence
The three constraints in Program 12 can be rewritten as:
In the space B (which is binding) we obtain:
Using the previous equation to derive I 1 11 and substituting the expression for B 0 00 , we obtain an explicit expression for I 1 11 :
We substitute the expression for I 
We now must check whether the participation constraint of the lender is satis…ed for the values of B 
which must be non-negative. Thus, IR L 11 is satis…ed if:
Recall that we are considering the case where : From (11) we know that:
Because the l.h.s of (14) is increasing in , a su¢ cient condition for IR L 11 to be satis…ed is that inequality (14) holds when substituting in the place of :
which is certainly true, being the previous expression the denominator of (10) . Hence, the constraint 
Substituting the value of B 0 00 we obtain:
Note that B Figure 1) , respectively, it must be true that the level of investment in the third best is lower than in the second best, I 
The answer is not. Indeed, the previous program is mathematically equivalent to the Pooling Contract analyzed in Appendix 6.2, which delivers the Pareto-dominated pooling solution B 
Proof of Proposition 2
The equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is Constrained Interim E¢ cient if a pair of Pareto dominating contracts …nanced by ethical banks and feasible in expectation does not exist. 
The objective function is thus increasing in I has to be binding. As a consequence, we can study Program (15) with both constraints binding. From the P C 
In words, ethical banks always earn negative pro…ts (also if T = 0) when o¤ering to standard borrowers an expected payo¤ p H B 
In f IR L 11 , ethical banks must earn positive pro…ts from the fraction q of motivated borrowers in order to cover the expenditure of providing T to the 1 q standard borrowers. The expression for the expected pro…ts L1 (T ) just derived before in (16) has been substituted in f IR L 11 . Let us focus on the three constraints of the previous program when T = 0 :
The system taken with equality is:
By comparing system (18) with system (13) analyzed in the proof of Lemma (2), we observe that the only di¤erence is in f IR L 11 , which now has the same slope but a higher intercept. In particular the intercept is now larger of the term and SS het 0=1 :
P that is: 
that is:
We can easily check that B 
The previous inequality takes into account that
which comes from the ine¢ ciency of misbehaving.
All this proves that, when T = 0; the constraints of system 18 can be depicted as in Figure 2 below. In particular, IC can be re-written as:
Starting from T = 0 and by increasing T , the intercept rises but the slope is unchanged. Hence, by
shifts even more on the left. As a consequence, the optimal B and therefore decreases.
Proof of Proposition 4
The equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is Unconstrained Interim E¢ cient if a pair of Pareto dominating contracts with cross-subsidies between ethical and standard banks does not exist. 
SS
T 0=1 (20) notice that, in IR L 11 , ethical banks must earn positive pro…ts from the fraction q of motivated borrowers in order to cover the expenditure of providing T to the 1 q standard borrowers. The expression for the expected pro…ts L0 (T ) just derived before has been substituted in IR . We want to check conditions such that a marginal transfer T; paid to standard borrowers, makes the expected pro…ts of motivated borrowers decrease, or such that the derivative 
it must be q > We can conclude that, by increasing the transfer T; the expected payo¤ of motivated borrowers always decreases and, thus, no pro…table pair of contracts with cross-subsidies exists. 
